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1.  Introduction: The Puzzle 
 
According to the (by now) standard view, (realis) Free Relatives (FRs) have the 
semantics of (singular or plural) definite descriptions (Jacobson 1995 a. o.): they 
either denote the unique atomic individual or the maximal sum individual 
contained in the set denoted by the respective CP, depending on whether there is 
only one or a plurality of individuals that satisfy the respective predicate.  The 
example in (1a) can accordingly be paraphrased as in (1b). 
 
(1) a. John ate what was on his plate. 
b. John ate the thing(s) that was/were on his plate. 
 
There are, however, cases like (2a), (3a) and (4a), where this correspondence 
between FRs and singular/plural definites breaks down, and where the FRs rather 
seem to behave as indefinites, as becomes evident by the paraphrases in (2b), (3b) 
and (4b).   
 
(2) a. What John reads is always/usually/often tasteful.  
 b. All/most/many things that John reads are tasteful. 
 (cf. Berman 1991 and Wiltschko 1999) 
 
(3) a. John wants to write what sells well.  
b. John wants to write a book that sells well.  
 (Wiltschko 1999: 705) 
 
(4) a.  Wer nimmt, was ihm nicht gehört,   
  Who takes what to-him not belongs   
  ist ein Dieb. 
  is a thief 
  ‘Who(ever) takes what does not belong to him is a thief.’  
 
 b. Everybody who takes something that does not belong to him is a thief. 
 (Sternefeld 2005: 1) 
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In the case of (2a), the quantificational force of the FR seems to vary with the 
quantificational force of the respective Q-adverb, as shown by the paraphrase in 
(2b).  Quantificational Variability Effects (QVEs) are usually associated with 
singular indefinites and bare plurals, however, not with singular or plural 
definites.  The pattern in (2a) is therefore surprising for an account which treats 
FRs as essentially equivalent to definite descriptions (apart from the fact that they 
are not marked for a singular/plural contrast).  
 Note, however, that it is not always impossible for sentences with definite 
descriptions to get QV-readings (I will come back to this point at the end of 
section 4).  Under certain conditions, which are discussed in detail in 
Hinterwimmer 2008, such readings are possible.  These conditions are not 
fulfilled in the case of (2a), however, as is evidenced by the fact that the examples 
in (5) below, where the FR has been replaced by a definite description, do not get 
QV-reading and are accordingly very odd – unless the individual level predicate 
be tasteful is re-interpreted as a stage level predicate.  The puzzle therefore 
remains. 
 
(5) a. ??The book that John reads is usually tasteful.  
b. ??The books that John reads are usually tasteful. 
 
Concerning the example in (3a), its meaning can be paraphrased adequately by 
the sentence in (3b), where the FR has been replaced by an indefinite.  In this 
case, too, replacing the FR by a definite description leads to unacceptability, as 
evidenced by the examples in (6): 
 
(6) a. ??John wants to write the book that sells well. (Wiltschko 1999: 705) 
 b. ??John wants to write the books that sell well.    
 
Note, however, that the examples in (6) do not show that definite descriptions are 
in general incompatible with verbs of creation like write, as Wiltschko (1999) 
claims.  It is just extremely implausible to ascribe to somebody the belief that in 
all of his belief-worlds (see section 3.1 for an analysis of sentences with want in 
terms of quantification over possible worlds) there is a unique book that sells 
well, or the wish to write all books that sell well himself.  If we replace the 
definite description in (6a) by one that makes more sense in this context, 
however, the sentence becomes perfectly acceptable, as is evidenced by the 
example in (7): 
 
(7) John wants to write the book that solves all syntactic problems. 
 
This is simply due to the fact that it is much more reasonable for someone to have 
a unique book that solves all syntactic problems in his belief worlds than a unique 
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book that sells well.   
 Finally, in the case of (4a), the two FRs are interpreted differently: the one 
in subject position receives a definite or universal-like interpretation, while the 
one in embedded object position is interpreted existentially.  While the 
interpretation of the subject FR is of course unproblematic for standard accounts 
of FRs, the interpretation of the embedded object FR is entirely unexpected.
 In this paper I argue that the peculiar behavior of FRs exemplified by the 
examples in (1)-(4) is best solved by assuming that FRs are ambiguous between 
an interpretation as ordinary extensional maximal sum individuals and an 
interpretation as kinds (see Carlson 1977), i.e. as functions from worlds/situations 
into the maximal sum individuals that satisfy the respective predicate with respect 
to the world/situation considered.  Since an entity of type <s,e>-cannot function 
as an argument of an object-level predicate, existential quantification over 
instances of the respective kind is triggered whenever a kind-denoting FR needs 
to be combined with an object-level predicate.  Indefinite-like readings of FRs 
like the ones above are thus a consequence of FRs sometimes being interpreted as 
kinds instead of ordinary extensional sum individuals.  But before I turn to the 
details of this proposal and its consequences, we will first have a brief look at two 
previous attempts to solve the puzzle posed by the examples in (1) vs. the ones in 
(2)-(4).       
 
 
2.  Previous Proposals 
 
2.1.  Wiltschko (1999) 
 
Wiltscko (1999), who concentrates on examples like the ones in (2)-(4), analyses 
FRs along the following lines: the clause-initial wh-term is not part of the CP, but 
is the external head of the clause, while the CP modifying the head contains an 
empty operator in its specifier.  Since the wh-terms are treated analogously to the 
indefinite wh-pronouns wer (who), was (what) etc. in German, FRs are interpreted 
accordingly.   
While this gives us the right results for cases like (2a) and (3a), it does not 
work for episodic sentences like the examples in (1), and for the subject-FR in 
(4a).  Concerning examples like (1a, b), Wiltschko (1999) proposes that in such 
cases the FR is interpreted as a specific indefinite (while the FRs in examples like 
(2a) and (3a) are interpreted as unspecific indefinites).  This, however, is 
problematic for the following reasons: first, wh-pronouns like wer and was can 
only be interpreted non-specifically.  Second, and more importantly, Wiltschko 
(1999) predicts that the FR in an episodic sentence like (8a) below should be 
interpreted identically to the specific indefinite in (8b).  This, however, is not the 
case: the FR only gets an exhaustive interpretation, i.e. in a situation where John 
recommended five papers to Mary, (8a) is false if Mary read only three of them.  
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(8b), in contrast, is true in this situation.  
 
(8) a. Mary read what John recommended to her last Friday. 
b. Mary read certain/some books that John recommended to her last 
Friday. 
 
Note that Wiltschko (1999) in addition to examples like the ones in (2)-(4) also 
cites some episodic sentences as evidence for her claim that FRs are interpreted as 
indefinites.  Her arguments do not go through, however, as shown in 
Hinterwimmer (2008).  While space prevents me from a more detailed discussion 
of her examples in this paper, I would like to mention the following case as an 
illustration: 
 
(9) a.   * Mary repeatedly killed the ant. 
 b.   Mary repeatedly killed an ant.    
c. Mary repeatedly killed what(ever) was in her way. 
(Wiltschko 1999: 704) 
 
According to Wiltschko (1999), the examples above show that FRs even in 
episodic sentences pattern with indefinites, not with definites, which she assumes 
to be incompatible with once only predicates (de Swart 1993) like kill that are 
modified by adverbs of frequency like repeatedly.  Note, however, that (9a) 
improves dramatically if the definite DP is modified by a relative clause like the 
one in (10) below, which is similar to the FR in (9c): 
 
(10) Mary repeatedly killed the ant that got in her way. 
 
I take this as evidence that the contrast between (9a) and (9c) does not have 
anything to do with (in)definiteness, but rather derives from the following fact: in 
the case of (9c) (as well as in 10) a relative clause CP is present that introduces a 
situation variable which can be bound by the adverb repeatedly.  In the case of 
(9a), in contrast, there is no such variable.  In Hinterwimmer (2008) I show that 
the presence of situation variables can lead to a relativization of the uniqueness 
condition associated with the definite determiner in singular definites, and such a 
relativization is exactly what is required in the examples under discussion: it is of 
course impossible that there are repeated events of killing one and the same 
person.  It is possible, however, that there are repeated killing events such that for 
each of those events there is a different unique individual satisfying the respective 
predicate.      
 
2.2.  Sternefeld (2005) 
 
Sternefeld (2005), which is just a squib, notes the existence of examples like (4a), 
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which are problematic for all existing accounts of FRs, because here two FRs 
receive different interpretations although they are contained in the same sentence.  
He does not make a real proposal as to how to solve the problem, but rather 
suggests that FRs might be ambiguous between an existential and a universal 
interpretation, and that it would be a topic for future research to determine the 
exact pragmatic conditions under which one of the two readings is available.     
 
 
3.  My Proposal 
 
3.1. The Basic Idea  
 
I propose to assume that FRs are ambiguous in the following sense: there always 
is an empty determiner present which takes the overt CP (whose specifier 
contains the wh-term) as its complement (cf. Caponigro 2002, 2004).  Crucially, 
this determiner comes in two closely related variants, D1 and D2.   The first one 
has the denotation of the definite determiner, i.e. it denotes the sigma-operator 
(Link 1983).  Accordingly, it returns an object of type e, namely the maximal 
(sum) individual that satisfies the predicate denoted by the respective CP with 
respect to either a contextually given situation or the world of evaluation (by 
default).  Its denotation is given formally in (11a) below.  The second one denotes 
a kind-forming operator that returns an object of type <s,e>, i.e. a function that 
for each possible world or situation returns the maximal (sum) individual 
satisfying the respective predicate in that world (cf. Chierchia 1998 and Dayal 
2004).  Its denotation is given formally in (11b).  
 
(11) a. [[  D1 ]]     =    "P<e,<s,t>>.#{x: P(x)(s1)},  
where s1 is a free variable that may either be resolved to a contextually 
salient situation or to the world of evaluation by default. 
b. [[  D2 ]]    =     "P<e,<s,t>>. "s.#{x: P(x)(s)} 
 
Note that (11b) corresponds to the empty D0 Chierchia (1998) assumes to be 
present in bare plurals in languages like English.  Accordingly, I assume that FRs 
employing D2 have in principle the same interpretative options as bare plurals in 
English (but see section 4.1 for a qualification of this statement).  Consequently, 
if they become the argument of an object-level predicate like read, write or take, 
existential quantification over instances of the respective kind is triggered.  
Furthermore, it is well known that in German kinds may either be realized by bare 
plurals or by plural definites (Krifka et al. 1995), while in Italian only plural 
definites are acceptable as kind-denoting terms in most syntactic environments 
(see Chierchia 1998 and Longobardi 2001 for discussion).  Since in these 
languages, too, plural definites can also be interpreted as ordinary extensional 
maximal sum individuals, we find the same ambiguity in the definite determiner 
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that I assume to be present in the empty determiner coming with FRs.  I will come 
back to this point in section 4.1.  
 My account now makes the following prediction: existential readings of 
FRs are only possible if the predicate denoted by the respective CP is general 
enough for kind formation (more on this in section 4.1).  Otherwise, it can only be 
shifted via D1.  This prediction is borne out: in an example like (3a), the 
existential reading disappears if the temporally unspecific CP-predicate is 
replaced by a temporally specific predicate, as shown in (12a).  
 
(12) a. John wants to write what Mary suggested to him last Friday 
 b. John wants to write the book(s) that Mary suggested to him last 
Friday. 
 c. John wants to write a book/some books that Mary suggested to him 
last Friday. 
 
In the case of (12a), the FR can only be interpreted as denoting the maximal 
(sum) individual satisfying the CP-predicate.  Accordingly, the paraphrase in 
(12b) is adequate, not the one in (12c): in a situation where Mary suggested to 
John that he should write a book about kangaroos, a book about Q-adverbs and a 
book about Elvis, (12a) is only true if John wants to write all of this books, while 
in a situation where Mary only suggested to John that he should write a book 
about kangaroos, it is sufficient that he wants to write that book.   
 Before we turn to some obvious questions raised by this account, let us 
have a closer look at how the readings that were problematic for the standard 
account are generated in detail. 
 
3.2. The Problematic Readings in Detail 
 
Consider (2a) first, repeated below as (13a), where the FR gets shifted via D2.  Let 
us first turn to the interpretation of the overt CP, which I assume to be a function 
from individuals into a function from situations/possible worlds into truth values.  
Concerning the wh-pronoun what, I follow Caponigro (2002, 2004) in assuming 
that it denotes the object given in (13b).  
 
(13) a. What John reads is always/usually/often tasteful. 
 b. [[  what ]]     =    "P<e,<s,t>>. "x. "s.  thing´(x)(s) $ P(x)(s)     
 c. [[  [C´ "1 John reads 1] ]]     =     "y. "s. %s´&s [read´(y)(j)(s´)] = 
 d. [[  [CP what [C´ "1 John reads 1] ]]     =              
  = "x. "s.  thing´(x)(s) $ %s´&s [read´(x)(j)(s´)] 
 
The trace it leaves behind in its base position is interpreted as a variable of type e 
which gets bound by a lambda-operator inserted directly beneath the landing 
position of the wh-pronoun in Spec, CP.  Note that I assume the world/situation 
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argument of the relative clause verb to be bound by a covert existential quantifier 
that is inserted at the TP-level by default, i.e. in the absence of an overt Q-adverb.  
Consequently, the sister of the wh-pronoun is interpreted as shown in (13c), and 
the entire overt CP as shown in (13d).    
 The next step now consists in applying the denotation of D2 to the object 
given in (13d), as shown in (14a).  The kind thus created has to be shifted to an 
existential quantifier over its realizations, as shown in (14b), because it becomes 
the argument of the object-level predicate is tasteful: 
 
(14) a. [[  [DP D2 [CP what [C´ "1 John reads 1]]] ]]     =     
   "P<e,<s,t>>. "s.#{x: P(x)(s)}        
       ("x"s. thing´(x)(s) $ %s´&s [read´(x)(j)(s´)]) = 
  "s.#{x: thing´(x)(s) $%s´&s [read´(x)(j)(s´)]}  
  
 b. "s.#{x: thing´(x)(s) $%s´&s [read´(x)(j)(s´)]}' 
  "k<s,e>. "P<e,<s,t>>. "s2. %y[Real(k)(y)(s2) $ P(y)(s2)]   
  ("s. #{x: thing´(x)(s) $ %s´&s [read´(x)(j)(s´)]}) = 
  "P<e,<s,t>>. "s2. %y[Real("s.#{x: thing´(x)(s) $                                              
                   $ %s´&s [read´(x)(j)(s´)]})(y)(s2) $ P(y)(s2)], 
 where ‘Real(k)(y)(s2)’ means for ‘y realizes k at s2’. 
 
The QV-readings of (2a)/(13a) now come about in the following way: the 
existential quantifier in (14b) is interpreted in the restrictor as well as in the 
nuclear scope of the respective Q-adverb, which I assume to be a selective 
quantifier over minimal situations (cf. von Fintel 1994 a. o.), as shown in (15). 
 
(15) [[  what John reads is always tasteful ]]     =     
 "s(s´&s. [min(s´, "s2. %y[Real(THINGS THAT JOHN READS)(y)(s2)]) )        
) %s3[s´ &s3 $ min(s3, "s4. %y[Real(THINGS THAT JOHN READS)(y)(s4) $ 
$ tasteful(y)(s4)])]] 
 
‘All minimal situations containing a realization of the kind THINGS THAT 
JOHN READS can be extended to a minimal situation where a realization of 
that kind is tasteful’. 
 
Note that I assume the quantifier in (14b) to become an object of the right type to 
be interpreted in the restrictor of the Q-adverb (namely one of type <s,t>) in the 
following way: it is applied to the dummy predicate "x"s. in(x)(s) (see 
Hinterwimmer 2008 for details).  This step is omitted here because the result it 
gives us is equivalent to the one shown in (15). 
 Concerning (3a), which is repeated here as (16a), the first two steps are 
parallel to the case of (2a)/(13a).  Following Heim’s (1992) analysis of want in 
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terms of quantification over belief worlds, we thus get a reading for the sentence 
that can be paraphrased as given in (16b). 
 
(16) a. John wants to write what sells well. 
 b. For every world w in the set of John’s epistemic alternatives to w0 it is 
the case that any world w´ that is maximally similar to w in which 
there is a realization y of the kind THINGS THAT SELL WELL such that 
John writes y in w´ is more desirable to John than any world w´´ 
maximally similar to w such there is no realization y of that kind such 
that John writes y in w´´. 
 
Let us finally turn to (4a), repeated here as (17a), whose most salient reading is 
paraphrased in (17b) again: 
 
(17) a.  Wer nimmt, was ihm nicht gehört,   
  Who takes what to-him not belongs   
  ist ein Dieb. 
  is a thief 
  ‘Who(ever) takes what does not belong to him is a thief.’  
  
 b. Everybody who takes something that does not belong to him is a thief’. 
 
Note that in this case the embedded object-FR, whose denotation is given in 
(18a), has to be shifted to an existential quantifier, as shown in (18b), before the 
denotation of the subject FR can be computed, i.e. before D2 can be applied to the 
denotation of the CP in subject position.  This gives us (18c): the partial function 
from worlds/situations s into the maximal sum individuals x that are human in s 
such that there is a situation s4 that is a part of s such that s4 contains a realization 
u of the kind things that do not belong to x such that x takes u in s4.   Shifting this 
object to an existential quantifier then gives us the object in (18d) as the final 
denotation of the subject-FR. 
 
(18) a. [[  was ihm nicht gehört ]]     =  
  "s2.#{u: thing(u)(s2) $   *%s3&s2 [belong_to´(u)(x)(s3)]} 
  
 b. "s. %s4&s [%z[Real("s2.#{u: thing(u)(s2) $  
       $ *%s3&s2 [belong_to´(u)(x)(s3)]})(z)(s4) $ 
           $ take(z)(x)(s4)]]} 
  
 c.. [[  wer nimmt was ihm nicht gehört ]]     =  
 "s.#{x: human(x)(s) $ %s4&s [%z[Real("s2.#{u: thing(u)(s2) $      
           $ *%s3&s2 [belong_to´(u)(x)(s3)]})(z)(s4) $ 
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                                             $ take(z)(x)(s4)]]} 
  
 d. "P<e,<s,t>>. "s´. %y[Real("s.#{x: human(x)(s) $  
    %s4&s [%z[Real("s2.#{u: thing(u)(s2) $ 
           $ *%s3&s2 [belong_to´(u)(x)(s3)]})(z)(s4) $ 
                                                                                       $ take(z)(x)(s4)]]})(y)(s´) $ 
                                     $ P(y)(s´)] 
Let us now assume that (4a)/(17a) contains a covert generic operator with quasi-
universal force (see Krifka et al. a.o.), and that the object in (18d) is interpreted in 
the restrictor as well as in the nuclear scope of this operator, analogous to the 
cases with overt Q-adverbs discussed above.  This gives us the reading 
paraphrased in (19) as the final denotation of (17a): 
 
(19) In general, minimal situations s that contain a realization of the kind 
PERSONS X SUCH THAT THERE IS A SITUATION S´ SUCH THAT THERE IS A 
REALIZATION U OF THE KIND ‘THINGS THAT DO NOT BELONG TO X IN S´’ 
can be extended to a minimal situation s´´ such that a realization of the 
kind PERSONS X  SUCH THAT … in  s´´ is a thief in s´´. 
 
Crucially, the minimal situations that the generic operator quantifies over contain 
a realization of the kind (that can be informally characterized as) persons that at 
least once took something that didn’t belong to them, not the kind persons that 
take everything that doesn’t belong to them.  Consequently, the casual thieves are 
(indirectly) counted as well as the professional ones, and we can account for 
Sternefeld’s (2005) observation that the subject-FR has quasi-universal force, 
while the embedded object-FR has existential force.   
This is due to the fact already mentioned above that because of being 
embedded inside the subject-FR the kind denoted by the object-FR has to be 
shifted to an existential quantifier before D2 applies to the FR-CP in subject 
position.  Consequently, it is only the existential quantifier corresponding to the 
subject-FR which is indirectly quantified over by the generic operator, not the one 
corresponding to the object-FR, which is simply too deeply embedded inside the 
subject-FR.  
We thus have a solution to the puzzle posed by Sternefeld’s (2005) 
example that two FRs contained within the same sentence have (seemingly) 
different quantificational forces.  Note, however, that in my account both FRs are 
treated uniformly insofar as they are both interpreted as kinds first, and are then 
shifted to existential quantifiers over realizations of the respective kind.  The fact 
that the subject-FR has quasi-universal force is simply due to its being interpreted 
in the restrictor of the covert generic operator.  In other words, (4a)/(17a) does not 
exemplify the ambiguity between an interpretation as extensional maximal sum 
individuals and an interpretation as kinds that I assume to be present in FRs.  I 
thus disagree with Sternefeld (2005), who assumes the quasi-universal 
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interpretation of the subject-FR to be equivalent to the interpretation as maximal 
sum individuals that FRs receive in episodic sentences. 
Having presented the basics of my account as well as the technical details 
of how it generates the right readings of the problematic examples introduced in 
section 1, I will now turn to a discussion of some questions it raises. 
 
 
4.  Further Issues 
 
4.1. Questions Raised by My Account 
 
My account raises (at least) the  following questions: 
 
(A) Why are bare plurals in English not ambiguous in the same way as FRs, 
i.e. why can they only be combined with D2, not with D1? 
 
(B) Why is temporal (non-)specificity the decisive criterion with respect to the 
availability of a kind(-like) interpretation for FRs, which then leads to an 
existential interpretation in the presence of object-level predicates? 
 
(C) Why do temporally non-specific FRs not get existential interpretations in 
episodic sentences such as (20)? 
 
(20) Yesterday, John took what does not belong to him. 
 
The FR in (20) can only be interpreted as referring to some contextually 
salient thing that does not belong to John.  The sentence accordingly does 
not receive the interpretation paraphrased in (21a), but only the one 
paraphrased in (21b). 
 
(21) a. Yesterday, John took something that does not belong to him. 
b. Yesterday, John took the unique (contextually salient) thing that does 
not belong to him. 
 
Let us turn to the question in (A) first.  Note that determiners in English – with 
the exception of those, which is demonstrative, however – can never be combined 
with a CP directly, but always need at least a dummy NP like ones as their 
complement, as shown by the contrast between (22a) and (22b):  
 
(22) a. *The, who came to John's party yesterday had a really good time. 
 b. The ones who came to John's party yesterday had a really good time. 
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Therefore, choosing the definite determiner instead of D1 is not an option in the 
case of FRs, which by definition do not contain an external NP.  In the case of 
bare plurals, in contrast, ambiguity can be avoided by choosing the overt definite 
determiner.  In the case of bare plurals, the absence of a definite determiner is 
therefore automatically interpreted as an indication that D2 has been chosen. 
 Concerning (B), note that the choice between pare plurals and plural 
definites also largely depends on the temporal (un)specificity of the respective 
predicates, not on criteria like "forming a natural class", "being well-established" 
or characterizing a set with large cardinality, as evidenced by the examples in 
(23) (see Endriss and Hinterwimmer 2006 and Hinterwimmer 2008 for more 
details):  
 
(23) a. (The) Norwegian students who wear thick green socks are usually  
      happy. (cf. Greenberg 2003) 
 b.  (??The) mosquitoes at the open-air concert yesterday evening were  
surprisingly large. 
 
In the case of (23a), a bare plural has to be chosen in order to ascribe the property 
of being happy most of the time to the totality of Norwegian students wearing 
thick green socks, in spite of the fact that the NP-predicate neither characterizes a 
natural nor a well-established class.  If the plural definite is chosen, the subject 
DP is automatically understood to refer not to the totality of students wearing 
thick green socks, but to a plurality of Norwegian students that have been 
introduced before.  In other words, the property can be understood to be 
relativized with respect to a particular contextually given situation and is thus 
made temporally specific.  In the case of (23b), in contrast, where the temporal 
adverb yesterday evening makes the NP predicate necessarily temporally specific, 
the definite article has to be chosen in order for the sentence to be fully 
acceptable, in spite of the fact that the set characterized by the predicate is 
presumably extremely large. 
 On the other hand, neither spatial specificity nor being located within a 
clearly delimited time interval seems to make the presence of the definite 
determiner obligatory, as long as the respective time interval is large enough.  
This is evidenced by the examples in (24) (from Hinterwimmer 2008: 203): 
 
(24) a. People who enter this room always like the paintings on the wall. 
 b. People who studied linguistics in the eighties usually admire 
Chomsky. 
 
In light of these facts, I suggest that D1 can only be applied to properties if it can 
be assumed that the resulting function of type <s,e> yields a defined result for a 
large enough number of situations, i.e. if there are enough situations containing 
individuals which satisfy the respective predicate.  Otherwise, either D2 (in the 
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case of properties denoted by a CP) or the overt definite determiner (in the case of 
properties denoted by an NP) has to be chosen. 
 Before I try to answer the question in (C), I would like to draw the 
reader’s attention to the following fact, which was already mentioned in the 
introduction: in German, either bare plurals or plural definites can be used to refer 
to kinds, as evidenced by the examples in (25).  
 
(25) a. (Die) Dinosaurier sind ausgestorben. 
  (the) dinosaurs are extinct. 
  ‘Dinosaurs are extinct’. 
 b. (Die) Affen  sind meistens/manchmal/immer schlau. 
  (the) apes are usually/sometimes/always smart 
  ‘Apes are sometimes/usually/always smart’. 
 
In other words, plural definites seem to be ambiguous in German in exactly the 
same way as FRs are in general, since they of course can still be used to refer to 
unique contextually salient maximal sum individuals like the one in (26): 
 
(26) Die Affen, die Peter gestern  im Zoo gesehen hat,  
 The apes REL  yesterday in-the zoo seen   has 
 waren wirklich schlau. 
 were really  smart 
 ‘The apes that Peter has seen in the zoo yesterday were really smart’. 
 
Note, however, that as soon as we turn away from sentences with kind-level 
predicates like (25a), adverbially quantified sentences like (25b) or generic ones, 
and have a look at episodic sentences, bare plurals can no longer be replaced by 
plural definites salva veritate, and plural definites cease to be ambiguous:   
     
(27) a. Ich  hab gestern  im Zoo Affen gesehen. 
  I  have yesterday in-the zoo apes seen. 
  ‘Yesterday in the zoo, I have seen apes’. 
 b. Ich  hab gestern  im Zoo die Affen gesehen. 
  I  have yesterday in-the zoo the apes seen. 
  ‘Yesterday in the zoo, I have seen the apes’. 
 
While the bare plural in (27a) receives the existential reading we expect in 
episodic sentences with object-level predicates, the plural definite in (27b) does 
not get an existential interpretation, but can only be understood to refer to a 
contextually salient plurality of apes like the apes you told me about etc.  Similar 
effects obtain in Italian, where in most syntactic environments only plural 
definites, but no bare plurals can be used for kind-reference (see Longobardi 2001 
for discussion). Crucially, however, while plural definites behave like bare plurals 
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in English and German in sentences with kind-level predicates and in adverbially 
quantified and generic sentences, as evidenced by the examples in (28a-c) below, 
this correspondence breaks down in episodic sentences like (28d): there, they can 
only be interpreted as unique extensional sum individuals, and do not get an 
existential interpretation (see Dayal 2006 for discussion). 
 
(28) a.   * (I) cani  sono diffusi. 
          the dogs are widespread 
       ‘Dogs are widespread’. 
  
b.   * (I) cani  abbaiano. 
          the dogs bark 
       ‘Dogs bark’.               
 (Dayal 2006: 18) 
  
 c.   * (I) cani  sono spesso intelligenti. 
          the dogs are often intelligent.  
       ‘Dogs are often intelligent’. 
 
 d.   I  cani stanno abbaiano. 
  The dogs are barking 
       ‘The dogs are barking’. 
 (Dayal 2006: 19) 
  
The facts from German and English show that the question asked in (C) is not 
peculiar to my account of FRs, but rather an incarnation of a puzzle we encounter 
when we turn to languages like German and Italian, where the ambiguity between 
an interpretation as a kind and an interpretation as an extensional maximal sum 
individual that I assume to be present in FRs is found in plural definites as well.  
From the present perspective, this puzzle can be phrased as follows: why can only 
unambiguously kind-denoting terms be shifted to an existential interpretation in 
episodic sentences, while ones that are ambiguous between a kind denotation and 
an interpretation as extensional sum individuals only get the latter reading in such 
sentences?  
 Note that in the case of unambiguously kind-denoting terms, there is no 
other choice than shifting them to existential quantifiers over realizations of the 
respective kind if they are to be combined with object-level predicates.  In the 
case of terms that can either denote kinds or extensional sum individuals, in 
contrast, there is always the option of interpreting them as extensional maximal 
sum individuals and resolving the free situation variable to some contextually 
salient situation in such cases.  Since this is more economical than interpreting the 
respective term as a kind first, and shifting it to an existential quantifier in the 
next step, it is expected to be the preferred option.  Seen this way, it is not 
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surprising that FRs in general and plural definites in German and English only 
receive an interpretation as extensional sum individuals in episodic sentences.  It 
is surprising, however, that they ever get indefinite-like interpretations, since in 
principle there would always be the more economical option of interpreting them 
as extensional maximal sum individuals. 
 With this in mind, let us have another look at the examples discussed in 
this paper where FRs receive an indefinite-like interpretation.  First, there are 
adverbially quantified sentences like (2a), where the quantificational force of the 
FR varies with the quantificational force of the respective Q-adverb.  I argued that 
this is a consequence of the FRs being shifted to an existential quantifier that is 
interpreted in the restrictor of the respective Q-adverb.  Second, we have mixed 
cases like (4a), where the matrix subject-FR gets a quasi-universal interpretation, 
while the embedded object-FR gets an existential interpretation.  I argued that in 
such cases both FRs are shifted to an existential quantifier, and the subject FR is 
interpreted in the restrictor of the covert generic operator.  Consequently, it 
receives generic force indirectly, while the object FR – because of its being more 
deeply embedded – retains its existential force.  Third, we have the case of (3a), 
where the FR is shifted to an existential quantifier that is interpreted in the 
nuclear scope of a modal operator, namely the verb want.  
 What all these examples have in common is that overt or covert 
quantification over situations or possible worlds is involved, while no such 
quantification is involved in the case of episodic sentences, which describe a 
single situation that is located within the world of evaluation.  In light of the fact 
that kinds are functions from situations/possible worlds into maximal sum 
individuals, it is not too surprising that there is an affinity between quantification 
over worlds or situations and a primary interpretation as a kind (that is then 
shifted to an existential quantifier over realizations of the respective kind): even 
after existential type-shifting has applied, the resulting proposition does not make 
a statement about a single individual, since the individuals realizing the respective 
kind vary with the situations/worlds quantified over – no matter whether the FR is 
interpreted in the restrictor or the nuclear scope of the respective quantifier.   
 In episodic sentences, in contrast, shifting a kind to an existential 
quantifier causes the resulting proposition to not only make a statement about a 
single situation, but also about a single individual.  While this does not seem to be 
strictly prohibited, as the case of bare plurals occurring in episodic sentences in 
English and German shows, it makes intuitive sense to see it as an option that is 
blocked in cases where another option is available – namely the one of 
interpreting the respective term as an extensional sum individual and thus a 
particular individual in the first place.  The same reasoning applies to the case of 
plural definites in German and Italian, which also do not get an existential 
interpretation in episodic sentences, but may receive an indefinite–like 
interpretation in adverbially quantified an generic sentences (see Dayal 2006 for a 
related proposal). 
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      Note that we could even go one step further and claim that existential 
type-shifting may never apply to kind-denoting terms in episodic sentences, but 
only in ones involving quantification over situations/possible worlds.  We would 
then have to follow Krifka (2004) in assuming that bare plurals are ambiguous 
between an existential interpretation and an interpretation as a kind in languages 
like English and German.  Consequently, the existential interpretation of bare 
plurals in episodic sentences would not result from type-shifting, but from 
ambiguity resolution, and FRs in general and plural definites in German and 
Italian would be the only kind-denoting terms to which existential type-shifting 
may apply – namely in the presence of a quantifier over situations/possible 
worlds.  I will not pursue this line of analysis further, however, since it is not 
central to my concerns in this paper. 
 
4.2. Further Evidence for My Account 
 
As already mentioned in section 1, not only singular indefinites and bare plurals, 
but also plural definites receive QV-readings under certain conditions (which are 
discussed in detail in Hinterwimmer 2008).  Endriss and Hinterwimmer (2006) 
and Hinterwimmer (2008) show that if we compare bare plurals modified by 
relative clauses with plural definites modified by relative clauses, it becomes 
evident that the availability of QV-readings is more restricted in the latter than in 
the former: in the case of plural definites the tense marking of the matrix verb has 
to agree with the tense marking of the relative clause verb, while in the case of 
bare plurals this is not required.  To see this, consider the examples in (29):  
 
(29) a.   Things that were bought in the eighties were/are usually ugly. 
b.  The things that Mary bought during her holiday were/??are usually  
        ugly.  
 
Both variants in (29a) easily get a QV-reading that can be paraphrased as Most 
things that were bought in the eighties are ugly and Most things that were bought 
in the eighties were ugly, respectively.  In the case of (29b), matters are different: 
only the variant where both the relative clause verb and the matrix verb are 
marked for past tense receives a QV-reading, which can be paraphrased as Most 
things that Mary bought during her holiday were ugly.  The variant where the 
relative clause verb is marked for past tense, while the matrix verb is marked for 
present tense, does not get a QV-reading, in contrast, and is accordingly odd 
unless the individual level predicate ugly is re-interpreted as a stage level 
predicate. 
 Interestingly, the same contrast that we see between bare plurals and 
plural definites can be observed between temporally unspecific FRs and 
temporally specific FRs, as evidenced by the examples in (30): 
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(30) a.   What was bought in the eighties was/is usually ugly. 
b. What Mary bought during her holidays was/??is usually ugly. 
 
This parallel between bare plurals and temporally unspecific FRs, on the one 
hand, and plural definites and temporally specific FRs, on the other, in and of 
itself lends further support to the account argued for in this paper, according to 
which temporally unspecific FRs are interpreted as kinds, which under certain 
conditions can be shifted to existential quantifiers over realizations of the 
respective kind, while temporally specific FRs are interpreted as extensional 
maximal sum individuals.  
Let us now turn to the explanation Endriss and Hinterwimmer (2006) and 
Hinterwimmer (2008) give for the contrast between bare plurals and plural 
definites.  The basic idea can be summarized as follows: situations quantified 
over have to be located in a time interval that is determined on the basis of 
contextually salient information.  In cases like (29b), where the plural definite 
that is interpreted in the restrictor of the Q-adverb is modified by a relative clause, 
the temporal trace of the situation introduced by the relative clause counts as 
maximally salient.  Therefore, the situations quantified over have to be located 
within the temporal trace of the relative clause situation.   
In the first variant of (29b), this is unproblematic: the situations quantified 
over are located within the temporal trace of the complex situation that comprises 
all situations of buying something that took place in the eighties.  Consequently, 
these situations, each of which contains an atomic part of the maximal sum 
individual denoted by the plural definite (see Hinterwimmer 2008 for a detailed 
account of how this is ensured), are located within the eighties.  For the sentence 
to be true, it is required that in most of these situations s the thing that was bought 
in s was ugly in s, where the past tense marking of the matrix verb adds the 
(superfluous) information that the situations of the respective thing being ugly 
took place before the time of utterance.  There is nothing incoherent or 
contradictory about such a statement, and because of the 1:1 correspondence 
between the atomic parts of the maximal sum individual that is interpreted in the 
restrictor of the Q-adverb, and the situations quantified over, we get a QV-
reading. 
In the case of the second variant in (29b), matters are different: on the one 
hand, the situations quantified over are again located within the temporal traces of 
the respective buying situations that took place in the eighties.  On the other hand, 
because of the present tense marking of the matrix verb, it is required that most of 
these situations are situations of the respective thing being ugly whose temporal 
traces include the speech time.  Since the past tense marking of the relative clause 
verb furthermore ensures that the eighties are located before the speech time, the 
sentence is necessarily contradictory on its QV-reading: no situation can at the 
same time be located in an interval that ends before the time of utterance, and in 
an interval that includes the time of utterance.   
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Let us now turn to bare plurals, which denote kinds, i.e. functions from 
situations/possible worlds into maximal sum individuals, and accordingly have to 
be shifted to realizations of the respective kind in the presence of object-level 
predicates.  It is therefore not the semantic object denoted by the bare plural 
directly that is interpreted in the restrictor of the respective Q-adverb.  
Consequently, the situations quantified over are not defined on the basis of this 
semantic object, but rather on the basis of their containing a realization of the 
kind denoted by the bare plural.  Endriss and Hinterwimmer (2006) and 
Hinterwimmer (2008) now assume that because the relation between the 
respective DP and the situations quantified over is more indirect in the case of 
bare plurals than in the case of plural definites, these situations do not necessarily 
have to be located within the temporal trace of the respective relative clause 
situation.  Consequently, no contradiction arises in the  case of non-agreeing tense 
markings. 
If my account is adopted, according to which temporally specific FRs are 
interpreted in the same way as plural definites, while temporally unspecific FRs 
are interpreted  in the same way as bare plurals, the explanation sketched above 
carries over straightforwardly to the contrast between temporally specific FRs and 
temporally unspecific FRs exemplified by the sentences in (30).  The facts 
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